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THE SUPREME COURT'S 
MISCONSTRUCTION OF A PROCEDURAL 
STATUTE - A CRITIQUE OF THE 
COURT'S DECISION IN 
BADARACCO 
Douglas A. Kahn* 
When a taxpayer files an honest 1 federal income tax return for a 
taxable year, section 650l(a) of the Internal Revenue Code2 limits 
the period of time during which the Government can assess a tax for 
that year to a three-year period commencing with the date that the 
return was filed. The three-year limitations period is extended for an 
additional three years by section 650l(e)(l)(A) if the taxpayer's re-
turn omits properly includible gross income in an amount in excess 
of twenty-five percent of the gross income that was reported. If a 
taxpayer fails to file a return for a taxable year or files a fraudulent 
return, sections 650l(c)(l) and (c)(3) permit the tax for that year to 
be assessed at any time; in other words,' there is no limitation on the 
time available to the Government to assess or collect the tax. 
If a taxpayer who failed to file a timely return for a taxable year 
subsequently files an honest delinquent return, the three-year limita-
tions period commences to run from the date that the delinquent 
return is filed no matter how tardy it is and irrespective of whether 
the taxpayer had a fraudulent purpose for failing to file on time.3 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court recently held that a ~axpayer 
who initially files a fraudulent income tax return cannot invoke a 
period of limitations by filing an honest amended return correcting 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
The author consulted with an attorney for one of the petitioners in the Badaracco case on 
the preparation of a brief in the Supreme Court. While the author sincerely believes that his 
views on the proper construction of the statute in question and his condemnation in this Arti-
cle of the Court's reasoning were arrived at independently of his association with that case, the 
reader is the best judge of the merits of the author's views and whether condemnation of the 
Court is warranted. 
I. An honest return is one in which deficiencies, if any, are attributable to bona fide differ-
ences of judgment or to innocent errors caused by oversight or negligence. 
2. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference herein to a section number will refer to a 
section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
3. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1982); Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114, 123 (1958), acq., 1958-2 
C.B. 3. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 52 U.S.L.W. 4081, 4082 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984); Rev. 
Ru!. 79-178, 1979-1 C.B. 435. 
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the fraudulent aspects of the original return. The Supreme Court 
held in Badaracco v. Commissioner4 that once a fraudulent return 
has been filed, there is no limitation on the time available to the 
Government to assess a tax deficiency and penalties for that year 
regardless of corrective action taken by the taxpayer or by anyone 
else. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Badaracco, the Tax 
Court and two circuit courts of appeals had applied a limitations 
period once an honest amended return was filed,5 but two other cir-
cuit courts of appeals had held that no period of limitations is appli-
cable in such cases. 6 
As will be shown below, the Supreme Court's eight-to-one deci-
sion in Badaracco was not merely poorly reasoned and erroneous; it 
was an egregious misapplication of the principles of statutory con-
struction. The issue resolved by the Court is not one of great mo-
ment, and the Court's mishandling of that issue is not in itself of 
much consequence. What is interesting is· how eight justices of the 
Court could err in such a seemingly easy case and what that error 
suggests as to the importance of continuing to provide for Supreme 
Court review of tax litigation. The case also serves as a useful exem-
plar of the "do's" and "don'ts" of statutory construction. 
Before addressing the lessons to be derived from Badaracco, it is 
necessary to make good on the author's claim that it can be demon-
strated to the satisfaction of a reasonably skeptical reader that the 
Court's decision was patently wrong and resulted from a poor tech-
nique of statutory construction. This is a heavy burden, especially 
since the decision was reached by an overwhelming majority of the 
Court and since two courts of appeals and at least one student law 
review note reached the same result.7 The reader must judge whether 
the author succeeds in satisfying it. This Article will first set forth 
the Court's reasoning and then will consider how the issue should 
have been resolved. 
4. 52 U.S.L.W. 4081 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984). Justice Stevens dissented. 
5. Dowell v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 52 U.S.L.W. 3550 
(U.S. Jan. 23, 1984); Britton v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 275 (D. Vt. 1981), ajfd. mem., 691 
F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1982); Klemp v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 201 (1981) (reviewed by the court), 
appeal argued, No. 81-7744 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1982). 
6. Nesmith v. Commissioner, 699 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3550 
(U.S. Jan. 23, 1984); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1982), ajfd., 52 
U.S.L.W. 4081 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984). For an approval of this view, see Note,Amended Returns 
and the Limitations Period for Tax Fraud, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 600 (1983). 
7. See note 6 supra. 
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I. THE DECISION IN BA.DARA CCO 
The Court's decision in Badaracco rested principally on a pur-
portedly literal reading of section 6501. Since so much weight was 
placed on the exact language employed by Congress, the relevant 
portions are reproduced below: 
§ 6501. Limitations on assessment and collection 
(a) General rule 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax 
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return 
was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date 
prescribed) . . . and no proceeding in court without assessment for the 
collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such 
period. 
* * * * 
(c) Exceptions 
(1) False return 
In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade 
tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of 
such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time. 
* * * * 
(3) No return 
In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a 
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun with-
out assessment, at any time. 
* * * * 
(e) Substantial omission of items 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) -
(1) Income taxes 
In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A -
(A) General rule 
If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly in-
cludible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of 
gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a pro-
ceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without 
assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. 8 
The Supreme Court determined that since the statute of limita-
tions in question is a limitation on the Government, it is to be strictly 
construed in the Government's favor.9 The Court then looked at the 
statute and observed that the three-year limitations period of section 
6501(a) was expressly made inapplicable where section 6501(c) ap-
plied. Subsection (c)(l) refers to a "false or fraudulent return." The 
Court noted that the Internal Revenue Code does not expressly pro-
vide for the filing of an amended return, which "is a creature of ad-
8. I.R.C. § 6501 (1982). 
9. See E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924). 
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ministrative origin and grace."10 The Court concluded that when 
Congress referred to a "return" in subsection (c)(l), it meant the 
original return - not the amended return. The Court noted that 
when an honest return is filed originally, the period of limitations 
runs from that date even if an amended return is subsequently 
filed, 11 and concluded that this indicates that the return referred to in 
section 6501 is the original return. Since the fraudulent return de-
scribed in subsection (c)(l) is the original return, the Court reasoned 
that the provision in that subsection to permit assessment of the tax 
at any time continued to be applicable notwithstanding the subse-
quent filing of an honest amended return. 
The Court found support for its decision in the fact that the filing 
of an honest amended return does not immunize the taxpayer from 
criminal or civil penalties for having originally filed a fraudulent re-
turn. Since the case continues to be one of fraud for purposes of 
imposing criminal and civil penalties, the Court reasoned that it 
should likewise remain so for purposes of granting the Government 
an unlimited period of time to assess the tax. 
The Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that a nonliteral 
construction of the statute was appropriate. The Court pointed out 
that its task is not to choose among conflicting policies and to pro-
nounce the wisest one; rather, the Court's function in a statutory case 
is to effectuate the congressional purpose for adopting that provision 
(as evidenced by the plain language of the statute). 
While the Supreme Court rested its decision on a literal interpre-
tation, it noted that if it were free to look to policy considerations, it 
could isolate several that would support its construction of section 
6501. Since the exclusive ground on which the Court based its deci-
sion is a literal construction of the statute, the author will postpone a 
discussion of those policy considerations until Part V of this Article. 
IL A LITERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE 
The result reached by the majority in Badaracco is grounded on 
the so-called "literal rule" or "plain meaning rule" of statutory con-
struction. The viability of that approach is questionable. Parts III 
and IV of this Article examine the recognized principles of statutory 
construction and address the matter of how those principles should 
be applied in construing the statute in question. First, however, let 
10. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4083. 
11. See, e.g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934). 
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us consider whether, even given a literal construction approach, the 
Court correctly read the statute. 
The Court treated a taxpayer's original return and a subsequent-
ly filed amendment as two independent "returns." The Court then 
concluded that section 6501 refers only to the original return. The 
Court emphasized that the Internal Revenue Code does not provide 
for an amended return, and thus presumed that an amended return 
is not the return mentioned in section 650l(c)(l). However, even 
though administratively created, an amended return has long been 
an integral part of tax administration. Amended returns are men-
tioned in section 6213(g)(l) and in numerous Treasury Regulations 
and administrative rulings. 12 The Commissioner provides printed 
forms for taxpayers to use in filing an amended return. 13 The mere 
absence of a Code provision authorizing the use of amended returns 
does not affect the jural significance of such returns nor does it ap-
pear to be relevant to the construction of section 650l(c)(l). 
Let us consider the literal language of the statute. Section 650l(a) 
requires that an assessment of tax, or the commencement of an ac-
tion to collect a tax without assessment, be made within three years 
after a return was filed. This provision constitutes the statute that 
limits the time available to the Government to institute a civil pro-
ceeding to collect a tax deficiency. By its explicit terms, section 
650l(a) applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" in that section. 
Section 650l(c)(l) provides that "In the case of a false or fraudu-
lent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a 
proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without 
assessment, at any time." An identical provision is made in section 
650l(c)(3) "[i]n the case of failure to file a return." These two provi-
sions are not statutes of limitations; rather they are suspensions of a 
limitations period. 
In its opinion in Badaracco, the Court disputed the suggestion 
that sections 650l(c)(l) and (3) are suspensions of a limitations pe-
riod. In so doing, the Court was concerned with the suggestion that 
the suspension was temporary since the Court deemed it to be per-
manent. It is not worth quibbling over whether sections 650l(c)(l) 
and (3) suspend a statute of limitations or whether they provide for a 
limitations period of infinite duration. In either case, the crucial 
question is whether a subsequent event can terminate the application 
12. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.§§ l.l034-l(i)(2); 30l.62ll-l(a); 30l.6402-3(a) (1983); Rev. Ru!. 
82-81, 1982-1 C.B. 109; Rev. Proc. 79-13, 1979-1 C.B. 494. 
13. Forms 1040X for individuals and ll20X for corporations. 
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of subsection (c)(l) or whether no finite period of limitations can 
ever be made applicable. 
Even a literal construction of a subsection of a statute does not 
rest entirely on a reading of that subsection alone. At a minimum, 
the reading must include the entire section of which the disputed 
provision is a part. Section 6501(c)(l) was not adopted in isolation. 
It is a subdivision of a subsection of section 6501 and as such is 
merely one aspect of the congressional plan for that section. To de-
termine that congressional plan and to determine the part that sec-
tion 6501(c)(l) plays therein, it is necessary to consider the workings 
of the entire section. 
From 1921 to 1954 (when the present Code was adopted) the sub-
stance of subsections (c)(l) and (3) was set forth in one sentence of a 
single subsection of the income tax laws. 14 The committee reports to 
the 1954 Code discuss the substantive changes to the 1939 Code pro-
visions that were included in section 6501 of the 1954 Code. 15 Those 
reports fail to mention the separation into two subsections of the 
treatment of the filing of fraudulent returns and the failure to file a 
return. The obvious inference is that this separation was stylistic and 
made no substantive change. Precisely the same operative language 
is used in sections 6501(c)(l) and (3) and in the pre-1954 single pro-
vision from which those two subsections were derived. Clearly, then, 
the two subsections are in pari materia. 
Section 6501(c)(3) suspends the period of limitations (or, if one 
prefers, establishes a period of infinite duration) "[i]n the case of fail-
ure to file a return." The balance of section 6501(c)(3) is identical to 
section 6501(c)(l) - namely, it permits the Government to assess a 
tax or to begin action for collection without assessment "at any 
time." As the Supreme Court itself noted in Badaracco, it is settled 
that this provision means that an assessment or action for collection 
can take place at any time, so long as there is still a failure of the 
taxpayer to file a return. Once the taxpayer files a return, even 
though it is delinquent, there is no longer a "failure to file a return," 
and so the suspension of or bar to the running of the limitations 
period is terminated. Consequently, assessment or action for collec-
14. See, for example, section 276(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which read as 
follows: 
In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file 
a return the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of tax may be 
begun without assessment, at any time. 
The Court noted this fact, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4083 n.6, but accorded it no weight. 
15. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 583-85 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. A413-14 (1954). 
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tion without assessment must take place within three years after the 
delinquent return is filed. 16 
Section 650l(c)(l) provides that an assessment or proceeding can 
take place at any time "[i]n the case of a false or fraudulent return 
with the intent to evade tax." As noted above, section 650l(c)(l) is 
inpari materia with section 650l(c)(3). Just as section 650l(c)(3) op-
erates to suspend or toll the limitations period only for so long as 
there is a failure to file a return, so does section 650l(c)(l) suspend or 
toll the limitations period only for so long as there is a false or fraud-
ulent return. If a taxpayer amends a return so as to correct its false 
and fraudulent aspects, the return will thereafter cease to be false or 
fraudulent for purposes of the statute of limitations, and so section 
650l(c)(l) will cease to suspend the running of the limitations pe-
riod. A continuation of the suspension of the limitations period ( or, 
if one prefers, a continuation of a period of infinite duration) there-
fore depends upon the legal effect of filing an amended return. 
As previously noted, an amended return is an important proce-
dural device that the Government provides for the reporting of tax 
liability. While an amended return is mentioned in only one statu-
tory provision, 17 the term appears frequently in Treasury Regula-
tions and in administrative rulings of the Commissioner. An 
examination of even a few of these regulatory and administrative 
provisions is sufficient to ascertain the operation and effect of filing 
an amended return. An "amended return" is not itself a return, but 
rather is a modification of the terms of the original return. For ex-
ample, section 621 l(a) defines a tax deficiency as the excess of a tax-
payer's tax liability over the sum of certain items, one of which is the 
amount of tax shown on the taxpayer's return. The Treasury Regu-
lations construe the statutory reference to the amount of tax shown 
on the return to include any additional tax shown on an amended 
return even though filed after the due date for the original return. 18 
Similarly, the Commissioner recently permitted a parent and a sub-
sidiary corporation to use an amended return to change an election 
they had made on their original return as to the manner in which 
certain inter-company pricing was to be determined. 19 The amended 
return was filed after the due date for the original return but prior to 
the expiration of the limitations period. Of course, a change of elec-
16. Badaracco v. Commissioner, 52 U.S.L.W. 4081, 4085 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984); Bennett v. 
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3; Rev.Ru!. 79-178, 1979-1 C.B. 435. 
17. See I.R.C. § 6213(g)(l) (1982). 
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-l(a) (1983). 
19. Rev. Ru!. 82-81, 1982-1 C.B. 109. 
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tion will not be permitted if an amended return is filed after the expi-
ration of the period allowed for making that election or if the statute 
permitting the election makes an initial choice irrevocable. 
The picture that arises from examining these consequences is that 
an amended return merely modifies the terms of the original return. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's characterization of an original and 
amended return as two returns is erroneous. There is only one re-
turn - the original return, as it reads before being modified by the 
amendment and as it reads afterwards. After a taxpayer who filed a 
fraudulent return files an honest amended return, the terms of the 
original return are modified so that they are no longer false or fraud-
ulent. Commencing with that date, the suspension of the section 
6501(a) period of limitations terminates. With the suspension re-
moved, the three-year limitations period of section 6501(a) begins to 
run. 
This construction conforms to the statutory pattern of section 
6501 as a whole. Subsection (a) provides a three-year limitations pe-
riod only when a tax return is filed. If no return is filed, section 
6501(a) does not establish any limitation on the Government's power 
to assess or collect a tax. The question then arises as to why Con-
gress adopted section 650l(c)(3) to suspend a limitations period that 
never commenced to run. The answer is that sections 6501(c)(l) and 
(3) merely highlight or clarify the operation of section 6501(a). 
These provisions must be read together as parts of an integrated 
plan. 
So long as no return is filed, section 6501(a) does not operate, and 
section 6501(c)(3) emphasizes that fact by stating that no period of 
limitations runs in such cases. Once a return is filed, section 6501(a) 
becomes operative and section 6501(c)(3) ceases to apply. While this 
construction is settled for tax years both before and after the adop-
tion of the 1954 Code, it was not "plainly" stated in the statutory 
language until the parenthetical clause in section 6501(a) was added 
as part of the 1954 Code.20 Section 6501(a) states that it applies 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section." Section 6501(c)(3) 
20. Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114, 123-24 (1958), ocq., 1958-2 C.B. 3; Paul Haber-
land, 25 B.T.A. 1370, 1376-77 (1932), ocq., 9-2 C.B. 4 (1932); J.P. Bell Co., 3 B.T.A. 254, 255 
(1925). 
Sections 275(a) and 276(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 read as follows: 
SEC. 275. PERIOD OF LIMITATION UPON ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION. 
Except as provided in section 276-
(a) GENERAL RULE. -The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall 
be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court with-
out assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such 
period. 
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might be said to provide otherwise since it permits assessment at any 
time in the case "of failure to file a return." A question could be 
raised as to whether the reference to a "return" in section 650l(c)(3) 
incorporates delinquent returns or whether the authorization to as-
sess "at any time" suggests that only a timely return precludes the 
operation of section 650l(c)(3). The 1954 Code's insertion in section 
650l(a) of a parenthetical clause expressly applying that section to 
delinquent returns removed any ambiguity from the statute; but 
even without that explicit parenthetical clause, it is a settled con-
struction of the ambiguous language of the pre-1954 version that the 
filing of a delinquent return terminated the operation of the antece-
dent of section 650l(c)(3), so that the antecedent to section 650l(a) 
then operated to impose a limitations period.21 This construction re-
flects a statutory pattern of mutual exclusivity for subsection (a) and 
subsection (c)(3) (and for their antecedent provisions) - namely, 
that subsection (a) does not operate when subsection (c)(3) applies 
and conversely that subsection (c)(3) does not operate when subsec-
tion (a) is applicable. 
The same statutory pattern is evident in subsection (a) and sub-
section (c)(l). Section 650l(a) operates only if a "return" is filed. 
The "return" referred to in section 650l(a) is a return filed by a tax-
payer evincing an "honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the 
law,"22 one which places in the hands of the Government the infor-
mation from which a proper assessment of the tax due can be 
made.23 A return that does not provide the required disclosure does 
not trigger the three-year statute of limitations. When subsections 
(a) and (c)(l) are examined together, it is evident that there is the 
same mutual exclusivity that exists between subsection (a) and sub-
section (c)(3). Thus, when a fraudulent or false return is filed, sec-
SEC. 276. SAME - EXCEPTIONS. 
(a) FALSE RETURN OR NO RETURN. - In the case of a false or fraudulent 
return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return the tax may be assessed, or a 
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any 
time. 
The 1954 Code added an explicit parenthetical statement in§ 650l(a) (which corresponds to 
section 275(a) of the 1939 Code) that the limitations period described therein applies "whether 
or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed." The Committee Reports to the 
1954 Code state that § 6501 did not change existing law as to the treatment of income tax 
returns. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A413 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. 583-84 (1954). Thus, the addition of the parenthetical clause to § 650l(a) merely 
codified the accepted construction of the two provisions that are now set forth in§ 650l(a) and 
(c). 
21. See note 20supra. 
22. Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934). 
23. Cf. Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 460 (1930) (con-
struing prior law). 
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tion 6501(a) does not apply and section 6501(c)(I) is the operative 
provision. Once the return is corrected by an amended return so as 
to cure its fraudulent nature, section 6501(c)(I) ceases to apply and 
section 6501(a) can then operate. Accordingly, the three-year limita-
tions period will commence to run from the date that a taxpayer 
amends his fraudulent return to provide an honest statement. 
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court found support for its con-
struction of section 6501 by analogizing to the legal rule that a tax-
payer cannot escape from criminal and civil penalties for fraud by 
filing an honest amended return. These rules are not relevant to the 
issue at hand. If the act of filing the original return constituted a 
willful attempt to evade or defeat the tax as proscribed by section 
7201, the original filing itself constituted the crime and cannot be 
expunged retroactively by filing an amended return. Similarly, sec-
tion 6653(b) provides civil penalties for fraud that causes an "un-
derpayment" of tax, and section 6653(c)(l) defines an underpayment 
so as to preclude consideration of the tax shown on a return filed 
after the due date. This language bars consideration of an amended 
return unless it is filed before the due date for the original return. 
The specific statutory language in sections 7201 and 6653 is quite 
different from that found in section 6501. More important, the poli-
cies involved are unrelated. An attempt to defeat a tax is a punish-
able offense, and the taxpayer's subsequent remorse will not 
preclude his punishment. But, as explained in Part IV of this Article, 
the suspension of a statute of limitations is not a penal provision. 
One way to test the validity of the Court's "literal" construction 
is to apply it to a different set of circumstances and consider whether 
the result reached squares with the congressional policy for adopting 
that provision. The Court held in Badaracco that only the original 
return is to be taken into account in determining whether section 
6501(c)(l) or section 6501(a) applies. Consider the application of 
that construction to the following set of facts. 
X filed an honest return in which X innocently omitted a signifi-
cant amount of income because of an erroneous judgment that the 
amount in question was excluded from gross income as a gift. The 
amount excluded was equal to twenty percent of the amount of gross 
income reported by X on the return. One year later, X discovered 
his error and became aware that his income was underreported on 
the prior year's return. Since the original return was nonfraudulent, 
there is a three-year period of limitations on the Government's right 
to assess a deficiency for that year, and X's subsequent discovery of 
an error should not affect that period even if X were to refrain from 
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disclosing the error. Whatever other consequences X's silence might 
incur, the running of the limitations period would not be affected 
( especially in light of Badaracco ). However, X decides to file an 
amended return. In doing so, X deliberately includes in the 
amended return only a portion of the unreported income, and thus 
files a fraudulent amended return. Since Badaracco held that sec-
tion 650l(c)(l) refers only to the original return (i.e., to the return as 
originally filed), the statute of limitations on what has become a 
fraudulent return will expire three years after the original return was 
filed. It is questionable whether this result comports with the con-
gressional aim in adopting section 650l(c)(l), and the author doubts 
that most courts would reach such a conclusion if this issue were 
litigated. But, to avoid this result, a court would have to strain its 
reading of Badaracco to escape from the holding of that case. 
III. A PROPER APPROACH TO CONSTRUING SECTION 6501 
REQUIRES THAT THE LEGISLATIVE POLICIES FOR 
ADOPTING THAT PROVISION BE TAKEN INTO 
ACCOUNT 
The Court's construction of section 6501 provides the Govern-
ment with unlimited time to assess and collect a tax even where the 
taxpayer has made a complete and honest disclosure of all of the 
relevant facts. As will be shown in Part IV, that construction is 
counter to the policies underlying statutes of limitation of all types 
and is inconsistent with the congressional purpose in adopting sec-
tion 6501. Before exaroioioe the legislative policies underlying the 
adoption of section 6501, let us first consider the propriety of the 
Court's reliance on a literal construction. 
The Court held that since the plain language of the statute pro-
vides that in the case of a false or fraudulent return the tax can be 
assessed at any time, in the absence of an explicitly worded exception 
to that provision or of an ambiguity in the language, the plain mean-
ing of the statute must prevail. The Court thus relied on a "literal 
rule" or "plain-meaning rule" of statutory construction. This ap-
proach contrasts with the so-called "golden rule" of construction, 
which construes a statute according to its legislative purpose even if 
that requires adding, deleting or substituting language.24 While nu-
merous cases can be found to support either of those two ap-
proaches, the more recent Supreme Court decisions ( other than 
24. See generally H.M. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144-1286 (unpublished). 
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Badaracco) have given great weight to legislative purpose.25 In 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,26 the Supreme 
Court stated, "As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to 
interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress 
sought to serve."27 In Watt v. Alaska ,28 the Court stated: 
[T]he plain-meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule 
of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence ifit 
exists." . . . . The circumstances of the enactment of particular legisla-
tion may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of com-
mon meaning to have their literal e.ffect.29 
Even those who adhere to a plain-meaning rule likely would 
agree that the "plain language" cannot control if it leads to an ab-
surd result. To take a time-honored example, consider the construc-
tion of a law adopted in Bologna, Italy a few hundred years ago 
"that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the 
utmost severity." A question arose as to whether that law called for 
the punishment of a surgeon who opened the vein of a person who 
had fallen down in the street in a fit. The literal or plain terms of the 
statute clearly applied to the surgeon's actions, but the language of 
the statute, when read in light of common experience, strongly sug-
gests that it was not aimed at medical treatment provided by a sur-
geon. The statute was deemed not to apply.30 
In effect, where the literal language of a statute conflicts with the 
apparent purpose of the act, which is discovered by examining the 
entirety of the statutory provision and of related statutes and by con-
sidering the background which gave rise to the adoption of the stat-
ute, the language can be said to be ambiguous. In any event, 
regardless of how narrow a reading is given to the term "ambigu-
ous," section 6501 contains ambiguities which can be resolved only 
by resort to the legislative purpose. Section 6501(c)(l) cannot be read 
in isolation from the rest of the statute. It operates together with 
section 6501(a) and section 6501(c)(3), inter alia, to comprise an 
overall statutory scheme as to the imposition of a period of limita-
tions on the Government's power to assess or collect taxes. 
As the Court noted in Badaracco, there is no explicit reference in 
section 6501 to amended returns or to the effect on that provision of 
25. E.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516-18 (1982). 
26. 441 U.S. 600 (1979). 
27. 441 U.S. at 608. 
28. 451 U.S. 259 (1981). 
29. 451 U.S. at 266 (quoting Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) 
(citation omitted)). 
30. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 (8th ed. 1778). 
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correcting false statements in an original return by filing an accurate 
amended return. The Court, relying on a plain-meaning approach, 
concluded that the failure to mention amended returns means that 
they have no effect on the operation of the statute. But that reading 
of the statute begs the question. One could just as easily have con-
cluded that, in light of the settled administrative practice of ac-
cepting amended returns, Congress' failure explicitly to restrict 
section 6501 to original returns demonstrates its intent to include 
amended returns. Section 6653(c)(l) supports this conclusion by 
demonstrating that when Congress intends to exclude amendments, 
"it knows how unambiguously to accomplish that result."31 The fail-
ure of Congress to address the effect of filing an amended return 
merely raises the question of whether that omission resulted from a 
deliberate decision of Congress to include or give no e.ff ect to such 
amendments or whether it was an inadvertence stemming from the 
failure of Congress to consider this question; it does not answer the 
question. 
As previously noted, an amended return is an important proce-
dural device provided by the Government for the correction of an 
original return. There are numerous regulations and administrative 
rulings that give the same effect to an amended return as is provided 
to an original return even though the operative statute makes no ref-
erence to an amended return.32 The Government's construction of 
various statutory provisions that use the term "return" to encompass 
amended returns in some such statutes and to preclude amended re-
turns in others suggests that the question of whether a statutory ref-
erence to a return encompasses amended returns must be resolved by 
referring to the legislative purpose of the statutory provision under 
review. 
It appears that when Congress adopted section 650l(c)(l), it gave 
no thought to the effect to be given to the taxpayer's subsequent 
filing of an accurate amended return. The issue in question thus falls 
within the most common area of statutory construction problems -
namely, it presents an unanticipated problem. The proper construc-
tion of statutes where an unanticipated problem arises was discussed 
31. Badaracco, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4084 (making the opposite argument for§ 6501). 
32. In addition to the provisions previously mentioned, see note 12 supra, consider Book-
walter v. Mayer, 345 F.2d 476, 479-81 (8th Cir. 1965) (permitting an election of the installment 
method of reporting to be made on an amended return), and Rev. Rul. 83-36, 1983-9 I.R.B. 10 
(holding that the underpayment of estimated tax by an individual is determined by reference 
to the tax shown on an amended return if the amended return is filed on or before the due date 
of the original return). 
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by the Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy33 as follows: 
In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion doctrine in 28 U.S.C. section 
2254, citing Ex parte Hawk as correctly stating the principle of exhaus-
tion. Section 2254, however, does not directly address the problem of 
mixed petitions. To be sure, the provision states that a remedy is not 
exhausted if there exists a state procedure to raise "the question 
presented," but we believe this phrase to be too ambiguous to sustain 
the conclusion that Congress intended to either permit or prohibit re-
view of mixed petitions. Because the legislative history of section 2254, 
as well as the pre-1948 cases, contains no reference to the problem of 
mixed petitions, in all likelihood Congress never thought of the prob-
lem. Consequently, we must analyze the policies underlying the statu-
tory provision to determine its proper scope. Philbrook v. G/odgett, 421 
U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (" 'In expounding a statute, we must ... look to 
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy'" (cita-
tions omitted)); United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 
(1969) (''where the statute's language seem[s] insufficiently precise, the 
'natural way' to draw the line 'is in light of the statutory purpose' " 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Sirson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-298 
(1970) ("The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory lan-
guage that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation is 
one that guides us when circumstances not plainly covered by the 
terms of a statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to which 
Congress was committed"); Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953) ("Arguments of policy are relevant when 
for example a statute has an hiatus that must be filled or there are 
ambiguities in the legislative language that must be resolved").34 
In light of the acknowledged construction of section 650l(c)(3), 
which was described earlier in this Article, to assert that Congress 
intended to provide an infinite period of time for the assessment and 
collection of a tax in the instant circumstance is to assert that Con-
gress intended to provide different treatment for a fraudulently moti-
vated failure to file a return from the treatment accorded to a filing 
of a fraudulent return. In the former case, it is acknowleged that a 
subsequent filing of a delinquent return will begin the running of the 
three-year limitations period. It is inconceivable that the legislature 
would intentionally prevent the application of a limitations period in 
one such case but not in the other. 
The Court did not attempt to reconcile its construction of section 
6501(c)(l) with the acknowledged operation of section 6501(c)(3). 
Instead, it fell back on a plain-meaning approach to statutory con-
struction and essentially shrugged off the obvious inconsistency of 
treatment as one of the anomalies of statutory law. 
33. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
34. 455 U.S. at 516-18 (footnotes omitted). 
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The Supreme Court sought to justify its adoption of the plain-
meaning rule by invoking the rule that where a statute of limitations 
is applicable to the Government it should be strictly construed in the 
Government's favor. It is difficult to believe that the result reached 
in Badaracco actually turned on the application of what amounts to 
a canon of statutory construction. Such "rules" are merely reflections 
of general experience; they should not be applied rigidly. The value 
of such rules is to provide a guide as to the likely purpose of the 
legislature where explicit evidence of that purpose is unavailable or 
unconvincing. But if the legislative policy for providing a limitations 
period would be thwarted by a strict construction, then the legisla-
tive policy (rather than a literal reading of the statute) should be 
enforced. It would be a strange principle of construction that would 
elevate generalizations to such a degree that a court would adhere to 
them rather than ascertain and implement the relevant congressional 
purpose. 
The Supreme Court did not explain what weight should be given 
to the "strict construction" rule that it adopted. Does it mean any-
thing more than that in cases where congressional purpose cannot be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty, the literal language should 
prevail if it favors the Government? If so, how certain of a contrary 
congressional purpose must a court be before it can implement such 
a purpose? The rule surely cannot require certainty beyond any 
doubt or even beyond a reasonable doubt. If the statutory language 
and history make it more likely than not that Congress intended a 
certain application, it would be a poor rule of construction that 
would insist that the statute be interpreted otherwise. The canon 
cited by the Court is only one factor to weigh with other evidence of 
statutory purpose; it is not a shibboleth to substitute for a careful 
inquiry into congressional purpose. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE CONGRESSIONAL 
PURPOSE FOR ADOPTING SECTION 6501 ARE CONTRARY 
TO THE Badaracco RESULT 
A. Function of a Statute of Limitations 
A major purpose of a statute of limitations is to "assure fairness 
to defendants. Such statutes 'promote justice by preventing surprises 
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
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disappeared.' "35 It was established long ago that "[s]tatutes of limi-
tation are founded on sound policy. They are statutes of repose, and 
should not be evaded by a forced construction."36 
The same considerations of providing repose for defendants led 
Congress to limit the period of time in which the Commissioner can 
assess federal tax deficiencies. There has been no manifestation of a 
congressional policy in favor of an unlimited assessment period.37 
Once a taxpayer has furnished the Government with an honest re-
turn, Congress has given the Government a definite period within 
which to determine any errors; after that period, the taxpayer is as-
sured that his tax liability cannot be reopened.38 When litigation is 
initiated many years after a return was filed, a taxpayer likely will 
have disposed of documents and records pertaining to those years. 
The availability of witnesses is also likely to be impaired. One of the 
reasons for granting repose to a taxpayer is to limit the number of 
years for which a person should feel obligated to retain records. A 
limitations period, therefore, should be disregarded only when there 
are strong countervailing reasons for denying a taxpayer the repose 
that Congress sought to provide. 
B. Suspension of Limitations Period 'Where Pertinent Information 
Has Been .Denied to the Government or 'Where False 
Information Has Been Provided 
If a return is filed in good faith, the Government is given only a 
limited number of years (usually three) to discover errors in the re-
turn and to set in motion the procedures that permit it to challenge 
the accuracy of the return. However, the limitations period on as-
sessment and collection of taxes is suspended in three circumstances 
set forth in section 650l(c)(l)-(3). The reason for precluding the run-
ning of a limitations period in those three circumstances is that each 
involves a situation where the taxpayer deliberately deprives the 
Government of information necessary to determine the tax or delib-
erately gives false information to the Government in order to mis-
lead it in determining the tax.39 The suspension is not penal. 
Rather, it is remedial for Congress to deny a taxpayer the repose of a 
35. Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (quoting Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). 
36. Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472,477 (1851);see also Clementson v. Williams, 
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 72, 74 (1814). 
37. See, e.g., Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114, 123-24 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
38. See Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 309 (1940); Mabel Eleva-
tor Co., 2 B.T.A. 517, 519 (1925), acq., 6-1 C.B. 4 (1927). 
39. E.g., Klemp v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 201, 205-06 (1981) (reviewed by the court), ap• 
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limitations period where to grant such repose would require the 
Government to discover the taxpayer's deficiency and to take appro-
priate action before the Government was given any notice of the 
problem. If the limitations period were not so suspended, a taxpayer 
who defrauded the Government and who succeeded in avoiding de-
tection for over three years ( or perhaps for over six years if section 
650l(e)(l)(A) applies) would be permitted to retain the benefits of 
his fraud. The statutory suspension of the limitations period (or, if 
one prefers, the establishment of an unlimited period) prevents that 
undesirable result from taking place. 
C. Commencement of Limitations Period Mzere an Honest and 
Complete Return or Amended Return Has Been Filed 
After a taxpayer files an honest return ( or, in the case of a fraud-
ulent return, an honest amended return), the Government has avail-
able all of the information that it would have had if such a return 
had been filed initially in a timely manner. Once the taxpayer has 
placed that information in the Government's hands, there is no justi-
fication for continuing the suspension of the limitations period un-
less Congress intended to use the suspension as a punitive measure. 
The Court has acknowledged and the Commissioner has acqui-
esced in the "settled" principle that the filing of an honest delinquent 
return triggers a limitations period even though the taxpayer had 
failed to file on time in an attempt to defraud the Government.40 In 
Bennett v. Commissioner ,41 the case which established that principle, 
the Tax Court stated: 
We must next determine whether the statute of limitations operates 
as a bar in petitioners' favor. Section 275(a) provides that the income 
taxes must be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed, but, 
pursuant to section 276(a), in the case of a false or fraudulent return or 
of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at any time. Ac-
cordingly, if petitioners had not filed their so-called delinquent returns, 
there would be no bar whatever. But we are of the opinion that the 
filing of such returns - provided that they were not false or fraudulent 
- would be sufficient to start the running of the period of limitations, 
notwithstanding that they could not operate to wipe out the so-called 
fraud penalty which had already accrued. For, once a nonfraudulent 
return is filed, putting the Commissioner on notice of a taxpayer's re-
ceipts and deductions, there can be no policy in favor of permitting 
assessment thereafter at any time without limitation. We think that the 
peal argued, No. 81-7744 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1982); Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114, 123-24 
(1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
40. Badaracco, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4085. 
41. 30 T.C. 114 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
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statute of limitations begins to run with the filing of such retums.42 
This settled construction of subdivision ( c )(3) belies the argument 
that (c)(l) is a punitive provision. It is inconceivable that Congress 
would use the suspension of the limitations period as a punitive 
measure for persons who file a false return for fraudulent purposes 
but not for persons who fraudulently attempt to avoid the tax by 
failing to file a return. A difference of purpose for section 6501(c)(l) 
and (c)(3) is especially unlikely since (as previously noted) for thirty-
three years -from 1921 until the adoption of the 1954 Code - the 
substance of those two subdivisions was included in a single sentence 
of one subsection of the income tax laws. 
The Court held that once a fraudulent return is filed no limita-
tions period can ever apply regardless of the taxpayer's subsequent 
disclosure of the facts by filing an honest and complete return. Con-
sequently, if B were to file a fraudulent return on April 15 (a Friday) 
and, after attending a religious service that weekend, had a change 
of heart and filed an honest amended return on the following Mon-
day, April 18, the statute of limitations for the assessment and collec-
tion of the tax would never run. Even B's death would not establish 
any bar to the Government's power to assess and litigate tax issues 
for the year for which B's original return was filed. Under section 
6901(c)(l), the Government can assess a liability against a transferee 
of B within one year after the expiration of the period of limitation 
for assessment against the transferor (B). Since, according to the 
Supreme Court's construction, there is no expiration of the power to 
assess against B, the one-year expiration period for assessing the tax 
against B's transferee will never commence to run.43 Consequently, 
even many years after B's death, the Government would not be 
barred from litigating such issues with the beneficiaries of B's estate 
or with the legatees of deceased beneficiaries. 
As previously noted, the purpose of the limitations in section 
6501 is to provide repose for taxpayers after the Government has 
had a reasonable period in which to determine whether to contest 
the tax reported by the taxpayer. Certain exceptions which suspend 
or extend the period of limitations are provided by section 6501(c) 
and (e) where the taxpayer provides the Government either with 
false information or with insufficient information to determine 
whether to seek additional taxes. In the absence of compelling con-
siderations to the contrary, the most likely intent of Congress is that 
42. 30 T.C. at 123-24 (citation omitted). 
43. See Leo Kubik, 1974 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 74,062. 
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the period of limitations will run in the normal course once the tax-
payer has provided the Government with the relevant information. 
In other words, once the special reason for suspending the period of 
limitations is removed, the suspension itself should cease to 
operate.44 
An additional factor demonstrates that the Supreme Court's con-
struction is contrary to congressional intent. As previously noted, 
section 650l(c)(l) and (3) contain identical language and are in pari 
materia. The Supreme Court, ignoring this common origin and lan-
guage, concluded that these two provisions are to be construed as 
producing drastically different consequences. According to the 
Court, a taxpayer who attempts to avoid his tax by fraudulently fail-
ing to file a return can terminate the suspension of the limitations 
period by filing a return at a later date, but if the commission of his 
fraud was effected by filing a false return, he cannot terminate the 
suspension of that period by filing an amended return or by any 
other means. The question raised by this comparison is not whether 
it is desirable to permit wayward taxpayers to terminate the suspen-
sion period; there is no dispute that a suspension caused by section 
650l(c)(3) can be so terminated.45 Nor is the question whether the 
rule applicable to section 650l(c)(3) should be extended to section 
650l(c)(l) or whether it would be inequitable to provide different 
consequences. Rather, the narrow question presented is whether 
Congress is likely to have intentionally provided such disparate con-
sequences to acts which are distinguishable only on a factual differ-
ence that has no substantive relevance. The thirty-three-year 
parallel history of the two suspension provisions as integrated parts 
of a single statutory sentence makes it clear that the Court's con-
struction is contrary to congressional intent. 
V. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS THAT WERE RAISED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT IN BADARACCO 
While the Supreme Court in Badaracco applied the literal con-
struction rule, the Court did note several policy considerations that, 
44. This argument, which is apparent from the structure of§ 650l(a) and (c), is even more 
explicit in § 650l(e)(l)(A)(ii): 
(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken into 
account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such 
amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner 
adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of such item. 
This is "plain language" evidencing Congress' concern with giving the Service a fair chance to 
discover a problem and Congress' decision to start the statute of limitations running once an 
adequate disclosure is made. 
45. See note 16 mpra. 
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in its view, supported its determination that no period of limitations 
applies to an initial fraudulent return. Let us examine those several 
policies. 
A. The Six-Year Period of Limitations Provided by Section 
6501 (e)(J)(A) 
Under section 650l(e)(l)(A), if a taxpayer improperly omits from 
his return an amount in excess of twenty-five percent of the gross 
income that was reported on the return, the period of limitations is 
six years instead of the usual three years. This provision does not 
apply if one of the suspension provisions of section 650l(c) is appli-
cable. Where section 650l(e)(l)(A) applies to a return, the lower 
courts have uniformly held that the six-year period of limitations 
cannot be shortened by filing a corrected amended return.46 The 
Supreme Court has never passed on this construction but in Bada-
racco acted on the assumption that it was· correct. The Court con-
cluded that since an amended return cannot shorten the six-year 
limitations period of section 650l(e)(l)(A), there is no reason to be-
lieve that Congress intended to permit an honest amended return to 
shorten the "any time" provision of section 650l(c)(l). 
There are several reasons why the judicial construction of section 
650l(e)(l)(A) should not be extended to section 650l(c)(l). It was 
established at an early date that the period of limitations for assess-
ing a tax is measured from the date that the original return is filed 
without regard to subsequent amended returns that might be filed.47 
This construction was deemed necessary to prevent an amended re-
turn from lengthening the period of limitations since if that occurred 
it would deter taxpayers from correcting their returns. When the 
question later arose as to whether an amended return could shorten 
the period of limitations (where, for example, the original return ex-
cludes a substantial amount of gross income and the amended return 
is filed at a date when there is more than three years remaining on 
the period established by section 650l(e)(l)(A) for the original re-
turn), the courts may have erred by mechanically applying the origi-
nal return rule without questioning whether di.ff erent considerations 
were present. Nevertheless, the substitution of a six-year period of 
limitations for a three-year period is so much less drastic than the 
substitution of a period of infinite duration that it is less obvious in 
46. E.g., Houston v. Co=issioner, 38 T.C. 486,489 (1962); cf. Bennett v. Commissioner, 
30 T.C. 114, 125 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3 (construing§ 275(c) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1939); Goldring v. Co=issioner, 20 T.C. 79, 82 (1953) (same). 
41. See note 11 supra. 
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the form.er case that Congress did not intend that result to occur. 
Indeed, when this construction was first adopted, it dealt with a 
predecessor of section 650l(e)(l)(A) which provided a five-year pe-
riod of limitations so that an extension of only two years over the 
usual three-year period was involved.48 If the amended return were 
filed immediately after the filing of the original return, there would 
be an extension of only two years, but typically an amended return 
would be filed at a later date so that an even shorter period would 
have been involved in those pre-1954 cases. 
The Supreme Court asserted that if an amended return could 
shorten the limitations period for purposes of section 650l(c)(l) but 
not for section 650l(e)(l)(A), it would lead to anomalous conse-
quences. If such were the case, a taxpayer who filed a return in 
which he fraudulently understated his gross income by an amount in 
excess of twenty-five percent of the gross income reported on the 
return would be able to shorten the limitations period for assessing 
his tax by filing an amended return while a taxpayer who innocently 
omitted a like amount of income could not do so. 
Even if that disparity of treatment were deemed to be anomalous, 
that would merely underline the question as to whether the current 
construction of section 650l(e)(l)(A) is correct. The Supreme Court 
has never ruled on the effect that filing an amended return has on the 
application of section 650l(e)(l)(A), and the lower court decisions on 
this issue may well be in error. In any event, as Justice Stevens noted 
in his dissent, section 650l(c)(l) is more closely tied to section 
650l(c)(3) than it is to section 650l(e)(l)(A), and so if a choice has to 
be made whether to have disparate treatment with either section 
6501(c)(3) or section 6501(e)(l)(A), it is more likely that Congress 
intended subsection (c)(l) be made consistent with subsection (c)(3) 
since those two provisions are in pari materia. 
B. Investigative Problems 
The Supreme Court asserted that when there is fraud in a case, 
the Government has greater difficulty in obtaining evidence and in 
meeting the burden of proof that must be satisfied to impose fraud 
penalties than it would in nonfraudulent cases. The Court stated 
that although the filing of an honest return will assist the Govern-
ment in uncovering evidence and establishing its case, it does not 
erase all of the handicap which the Government must endure in 
fraud cases. The Court feared that the normal three-year period of 
48. See I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939) (repealed 1954). 
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limitations "may not be enough time for the Commissioner to prove 
fraudulent intent."49 
The Court's approach at this point again demonstrates the inade-
quacy of its chosen method of statutory construction. After stating 
its task fairly well, the Court is led astray by the plain meaning rule. 
Since it read the plain language of the statute as providing the Gov-
ernment with an unlimited time to proceed, the Court apparently felt 
that any policy support for that construction would be sufficient to 
justify it. However, such policy support is exactly what the Court 
failed to provide, and what it could not provide in light of the avail-
able statutory evidence of congressional intent. Initially, one might 
observe that the Court did not refer to any empirical data or legisla-
tive history to support its assertion that the Government has great 
difficulty in establishing its case in these circumstances or to support 
its assumption that the added difficulty is of such magnitude as to 
make• a three-year limitations period inadequate and to warrant 
granting the Government an unlimited period of time to investigate 
and decide whether to go forward. But the Court's .real error here 
was in asking (and attempting to answer) the wrong question. The 
Court addressed the policy considerations on the basis that it had to 
find no more than some modicum of support for believing that Con-
gress intentionally created a longer limitations period than three 
years. But that is not the proper issue. The question is whether the 
more likely intention of Congress was to limit the Government to 
three years after an honest amended return was filed or to impose no 
time limitation at all on the Government in such cases. And on that 
issue, the policies as enacted by Congress point unambiguously to-
ward the establishment of a three-year limitations period. 
As previously explained, it is settled that the three-year limita-
tions period commences to run when a delinquent income tax return 
is filed even where the taxpayer's purpose in failing to file on time 
was an attempt to defraud the Government and to defeat the tax.so 
This construction was established prior to the adoption of the 1954 
Code. The willful failure to file a tax return can constitute tax fraud 
if there is evidence of an overt act that indicates a fraudulent pur-
pose. s 1 The failure to file a return has been found to constitute tax 
fraud in a sufficiently large number of cases to make it a virtual cer-
tainty that when Congress adopted the 1954 Code it was aware that a 
meaningful number of the persons who fail to file do so for fraudu-
49. Badaracco, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4085. 
50. See note 16 supra. 
51. See Bennett v. Co=issioner, 30 T.C. 114, 122-23 (1958), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 3. 
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lent purposes. Yet, in adopting the 1954 Code, Congress added the 
parenthetical clause to section 650l(a) which codified the construc-
tion of that provision that limited the Government's time period for 
proceeding in such cases to three years after a delinquent return is 
filed. In dealing with the limitations problem, Congress did not dis-
tinguish the fraudulent taxpayer from the negligent or innocent tax-
payer who misses a deadline for filing a return. Any investigative 
problems that arise when fraud and deceit are present are at least as 
prevalent when the taxpayer files no timely return as they are when 
the taxpayer files a false return. Regardless of how burdensome the 
Government's task of establishing fraud may be, the critical issue is 
whether Congress deemed it to be of such magnitude as to warrant 
permanently suspending the statute of limitations. It is inconceiv-
able that Congress would have deemed the Government's task to be 
insufficiently burdensome to preclude the imposition of a three-year 
limitations period when a taxpayer fraudulently failed to file a return 
on time but would have deemed the same burden as sufficient to 
preclude the availability of any limitations period when a false re-
turn was filed initially and later corrected. 
The asserted fear of the magnitude of the Government's burden 
is even less convincing when it is considered that the Government 
has the benefit of being able to compare the amended return with the 
original false return. The contrast between the terms of the original 
return and the modifications made by the honest amended· return 
should be of considerable assistance to the Government in establish-
ing its case. Obviously, the Government's difficulties in establishing 
fraud are greater when no return is filed than when a false return is 
filed and later corrected; yet, it is settled that in the former case, the 
filing of an honest delinquent return will start the running of a three-
year limitations period.52 
C. The Unavailability of the Summons Procedure as an 
Investigative Tool 
As additional support for its assertion that a three-year limita-
tions period is insufficient time in light of the added burden of inves-
tigation in fraud cases, the Court pointed out that once the Service 
refers a case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution, it 
is barred from using the summons procedure authorized by section 
7602 to examine books, documents and witnesses.53 The Court de-
52. See note 16 supra. 
53. See United States v. La Salle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978). 
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termined, therefore, that there is a policy justification for permitting 
the Service an unlimited time to assess and collect the tax so that it 
can defer the civil litigation until after the criminal prosecution has 
been resolved. 
Presumably, the Service does not refer a case for criminal prose-
cution unless it already has substantial evidence that fraud is pres-
ent. It appears doubtful that loss of further use of the summons 
procedure is a meaningful obstacle to the Service's civil 
investigation. 
Section 6531 (2) limits the Government to a period of six years 
from the date that a fraud was committed to commence a criminal 
prosecution. In that six-year period, the Government has to uncover 
the fraud and gamer sufficient evidence to warrant prosecuting the 
taxpayer. Congress did not make available the civil summons proce-
dure for investigating criminal fraud and it did not provide the Gov-
ernment with an unlimited period of time to investigate. If such 
procedures have not been needed for criminal prosecution, where 
the Government's burden is far greater than it is in civil litigation, it 
is hardly likely that such procedures are essential for civil litigation 
in circumstances where the Government already has sufficient evi-
dence to go forward on the criminal aspect of the case. It is even 
more unlikely that Congress intended to provide an unlimited time 
period to the Government in order to protect the availability of civil 
summons procedures. 
Even if the loss of further use of summons procedures were a 
significant problem for the Government, the identical problem exists 
when a taxpayer fails to file a return for the fraudulent purpose of 
attempting to defeat the tax. Yet, if the taxpayer files a delinquent 
honest return, the three-year limitations period commences to run 
even if the Government concurrently goes forward with a criminal 
prosecution. Congress obviously did not rate this problem as one of 
sufficient magnitude to override the long-standing policies that have 
induced legislatures to establish limitations on the period of time 
available to determine whether to litigate a dispute. There is no rea-
son to believe that Congress felt differently in the circumstances 
where the taxpayer filed a fraudulent return. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE IN TAX LITIGATION 
Even if the reader agrees with the author that the decision of the 
majority in Badaracco was patently wrong, the question arises as to 
what purpose, other than inspiring corrective congressional action, 
there is in demonstrating that the Court made one bad decision. The 
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significant aspect of this tax case is that it did not involve the apppli-
cation of a complex, technical statutory provision. Rather, the case 
concerned a statute of limitations and the difficulties encountered by 
the Government in administering a specialized area of the law. 
These are common issues of general concern that presumably are 
brought before the Supreme Court in a variety of contexts. Yet, in 
confronting these issues, eight Justices of the Court did not p~rform 
especially well. 
Proposals are occasionally advanced to withdraw tax cases ( other 
than cases raising constitutional issues) from the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction and to substitute a specialized court of last resort to re-
view all tax litigation. A frequent objection to such proposals is that 
it is important to preserve the input of judges who hear a wide range 
of cases and who thus have a broader perspective than would a spe-
cialized court restricted to a narrow technical field. 54 One possible 
method of testing the validity of this objection would be to examine 
the Supreme Court's disposition of a number of tax cases in which 
broader issues were present,55 although it may be hard (if not impos-
sible) to reach a consensus as to the identity of the cases which pres-
ent broader issues and as to the quality of the Court's disposition of 
those issues. This Article should provide one datum of evidence that 
could be accumulated with evaluations of other tax decisions in or-
der to rate the Supreme Court's performance in this area. 
There is no suggestion here that the Supreme Court performs 
more poorly in tax cases than do other courts. Indeed, in the au-
thor's view, the Supreme Court does a better job of passing on tax 
issues than do other courts. The question is whether the members of 
the Supreme Court have special experience or insights that make it 
especially important that the Court retain jurisdiction over tax litiga-
tion even if other policies point to relieving the Court of that burden. 
Some persons (including the author) have· harbored doubts that the 
Court makes a special contribution to tax law in that respect, and 
Badaracco may reinforce those doubts. 
54. See Craig, Federal Income Tax and the Supreme Court: The Case Against a National 
Court of Tax Appeals, 1983 UTAH L. REv. - (in press). 
55. Id. 
